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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE PROHIBITION AMENDMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
QUINCY WRIGHT*
,"T HE eighteenth amendment," said Justice Holmes of the
Supreme Court, in the Grogan and Anchor Line Cases,
"meant a great revolution in the policy of this country, and
presumably and obviously meant to upset a good many things
on as well as off the ftatute books."' It is not surprising that
the reconciliation of the amendment with time honored principles
of public law has proved a difficult process. With the claim that
the amendment overthrew individual and states rights more funda-
mental than the constitution, and with the efforts of the boot-
leggers to shelter themselves under the unreasonable search and
seizure clause the international lawyer is not concerned.2 When,
however, the Supreme Court follows the statement just quoted,
with the announcement that the amendment "did not confine
itself in any meticulous way to the use of intoxicants in this
country," he may well prick up his ears or even raise his voice
as did three justices of the court, who, though almost ashamed
to criticize "the attractive spectacle of a people too animated for
reform to hesitate to make it as broad as the universe of hu-
manity," nevertheless did so with an admonition to their brethern
of the majority.
"I put my dissent," writes Justice McKenna, speaking also
for Justices Day and Clarke, "upon the inherent improbability
of such intention-not because it takes a facility from intoxi-
cating liquor, but because of its evil and invidious precedent,
and this at a time when the nations of the earth are as-
sembling in leagues and conferences to assure one another
that diplomacy is not deceit and that there is a security in the
declaration of treaties, not only against material aggression
but against infidelity to engagements when interest tempts or
some purpose antagonizes. Indeed I may say there is a grow-
ing aspiration that the time will come when nations will not
do as they please and bid their wills avouch it."
*Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
'Grogan v. Walker, Anchor Line v. Aldrich, (1922) 42 S.C.R. 423.2 See Abbott, Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment, 20
Col. L. Rev. 183.
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The admonition, however, has proved of no avail. The major-
ity opinion in this case, delivered by Justice Holmes on May 15,
1922, held that liquor could not be transferred from one British
vessel to another in an American port for shipment to a foreign
country and that Great Britain could not ship liquor under bond
from Canada via Detroit though transit of bonded goods with-
out customs seemed to be guaranteed by article 29 of the Treaty
of Washington of 1871. On October 6th, Attorney General
Daugherty 3 deduced from this opinion a prohibition upon the
"possession and transportation of beverage liquor on board for-
eign vessels while in American territorial waters, whether such
liquors are sealed or open," and on October 23rd, Justice Learned
Hand of the federal court of the southern district of New York4
refused to enjoin the secretary of the treasury from putting this
interpretation into effect except with reference to ship's stores
for the'use of the crew. Pending final review of this decision
by the Supreme Court, and in consideration of the informal
complaints of foreign governments as well as the difficulty of
perfecting enforcement regulations, the executive officials have
temporarily withheld enforcement.5
Aside from the questions of the (1) sanctity of treaties and
(2) the immunities of foreign merchant vessels in port here
involved, the zeal of officers enforcing the eighteenth amendment
and the Volstead Act has raised the question of (3) the right to
seize suspicious vessels beyond the three mile limit.
1. IMPAIRMENT OF TREATIES.
On the question of treaty violation, international law has but.
one answer. Treaties are made to be kept.
"It is an essential principle of the law of nations," asserted
the London Protocol of 1871, "that no power can liberate it-
self from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipula-
tions thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting
powers by means of an amicable arrangement."6
3Daugherty, Att. Gen., Opinion Oct. 6, 1922. Text printed in New
York Times, Oct. 7, 1922. In an opinion of July 7, 1921, Attorney Gen-
eral Daugherty had denied the right of transit to intoxicating beverages,
thereby agreeing with Acting Attorney General Nebeker's opinion of Feb.
4, 1921. 32 op. 419.
4Cunard Line v. Mellon, Oct. 23, 1922. Text printed in New York
Times, Oct. 24, 1922, p. 2.5Press Reports, Oct. 25, 1922.
62 Satow, Diplomatic Practice 131; Hall, International Law, 7th ed.,
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The only international defense is that the treaty was not
binding and in this case something can be said on that score.
Article 29 of the treaty of Washington which provided ior
reciprocal transit of goods through the United States and Can-
ada without customs duties, was to continue only for the term
of years mentioned in article 33. This in turn provided that art-
icles 18 to 25 inclusive and article 30 would continue for ten
years and further until the expiration of two years after notice
of termination by either party. Under this article the United
States denounced articles 18 to 25 and article 30 in 1883 and
though the act of denunciation failed to mention article 29,
Presidents Cleveland and Harrision subsequently expressed the
opinion that it had been terminated.7 Though referring to these
opinions the Supreme Court proceeded on the assumption that
the treaty was binding.8
So far as American law is concerned, there is no doubt but
that a constitutional amendment or a later act of Congress will
prevail over a treaty' though such provisions are interpreted to
save the treaty if possible."0
"Zeal," said. the dissenting justices, "takes care to be ex-
plicit in purpose and it cannot be supposed that sec. 3005 and
the treaty were unknown and their relation-harmony or con-
flict-with the new policy, and it must have been concluded
that there was harmony, not conflict."
"We appreciate all this," said the majority, "but are of opinion
that the letter is too strong in this case."
2. FOREIGN PRIVATE VESSELS IN PORT.
The same rule of interpretation applies to customary inter-
national law."1 The courts apply it as part of the law of the
78 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the President 623-625; vol. 9,
p. 340.
sThe dissenting justices give the existence of the treaty as the leading
reason for their opinion, yet the precedents would -seem to require the
Supreme Court to follow the president's decision in such a political ques-
tion as treaty termination. Doe v. Braden, (1853) 16 How. (U.S.) 635, 14
L. Ed. 1090; Terlinden v. Ames, (1902) 184 U.S. 270, 46 L. Ed. 534, 22 S.
C.R. 484; Wright, Control of American Foreign Relations 172.
OThe Chinese Exclusion Case, (1888) 130 U.S. 581, 32 L. Ed. 1068,
9 S.C.R. 623; The Cherokee Tobacco Case, (1870) 11 Wall (U.S.) 616,20 L.
Ed. 227; The Head Money Cases, (1884) 112 U.S. 580, 28 L. Ed. 798, 5
S.C.R. 247; 5 Moore, Diest of Int. Law, 
167, 356-370.
1oWhitney v. Robertson, (1887) 124 U.S. 190, 31 L. Ed. 306, 8 S.C.R.
456; In re Dillon, (1874) 7 Sawy. (C.C.) 561, Fed. Cas. 3,914.
"
1 The Paquette Habana, (1900) 175 U.S. 677, 44 L. Ed. 320, 20 S.C.R.
290.
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land unless a constitutional provision, statute or treaty con-
flicts.' 2  But since foreign nations are not barred from present-
ing claims by such provisions of domestic law" the courts and
executive officials have always endeavored to interpret them in
accord with international law. if possible.' 4  Especially is this
true with reference to constitutional provisions. Thus the com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses guaranteed to accused
persons by the sixth amendment has always been construed in
accord with the usual exemption from such process enjoyed by
resident diplomatic officers. 15 The eighteenth amendment itself
has not been allowed to impair the immunity of diplomatic bag-
gage. Under date of April 29, 1922, the department of state in-
formed the writer:
"No change has been made with respect to the privilege of
entry free of duty without examination of the baggage and
other effects of diplomatic officers accredited to this govern-
ment, which privilege is accorded to them under articles 376
and 377 of the Customs Regulations of 1915."
There seems to have been no question of the immunity from
search for liquor of foreign public vessels in port. Foreign
private vessels in port, however, have been held within the pro-
hibition by appeal to the words of the statute, to the requirements
of administrative efficiency and to the duty of protecting Ameri-
can vessels from unfair competition.
The Supreme Court based the decision already cited on the
prohibition by the eighteenth amendment of "transportation of
intoxicating liquors . . . within the United States and all
territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage pur-
poses." It is to be noticed that the otherprohibitions, "manufacture
and sale within," "importation into" and "exportation from" the
United States, are not involved and that "transportation within"
is given a somewhat broad interpretation. The attorney general,
however, was influenced by the Volstead Act which also prohib-
its "possession," though that term is not found in the amendment.
He also fortified himself by Justice Holmes' argument that the
makers of the amendment "reasonably may have thought that if
they let it (liquor) in, some of it was likely to stay," in spite of
"2Wright, 11 Am. Jnl. Int. Law 5,8, 575.
'sBorchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 181; Wright,
Control of American Foreign Relations 17-18.14Murray v. The Charming Betsey, (1804) 2 Cranch (U.S.) 64, 118,
2 L. Ed. 208; Wright, 11 Am. Jnl. Int. Law 10, 575.
154 Moore's Digest, 643-645; vol. 5 pp. 167-168.
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Justice McKenna's insistence that this "presented the United
States in an invidious light," and his doubt whether even if the
"watchfulness of the government may be evaded . . . such
petty pilferings can so determine the policy of the country as to
justify the repeal of an act of Congress, and violation or abro-
gation of its treaty obligation by implication." An additional ar-
row in the attorney general's quiver was supplied by his own
opinion barring carriage of liquor by American ships on the high
seas. With that opinion "the results of granting the privilege
to foreign ships would be to produce manifestly unfair condi-
tions of competition for our own citizens and shipping interests."
The Supreme Court based its decision on a literal reading
of the amendment with but scant attention to the rule of interna-
tional law on which the foreign ships claimed immunity, yet
with Chief Justice Marshall's rule that "an act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains,"'1 such consideration would seem
appropriate in determining the true meaning of the amendment
and the Volstead Act. For determining the international re-
sponsibilities of the United States, it is of course fundamental.1 7
In appreciation of these facts Attorney General Daugherty cited
several authorities on the completeness of territorial jurisdiction,",
to indicate conformity of his opinion to international law, but
refrained from an exhaustive examination of the question.
Does international law permit the United States to make and
enforce laws prohibiting intoxicating beverages from foreign
private vessels in port?
Several theories have been advanced with reference to the
exemption of private vessels in port, the British view in general
holding against such exemption, and the French holding for it,
'(Murray v. The Charming Betsey, (1804) 2 Cranch (U.S.) 64, 118,
2 L. Ed. 208; Wright, 11 Am. Jnl. Int. Law 10, 575.
17 Supra note 13. France has informally suggested submission of the
question to the permanent court of international justice, which would be
bound only by treaty and international law. (Statute of the court, art. 38,
22 Col. L. Rev. June No.). Judging from the nationality of a majority of its
judges the continental European view of international law would be likely
to prevail in this court.
IsUnited States v. Diekelman, (1875) 92 U.S. 520, 525, 23 L. Ed. 712;
2 Moore's Digest 275 et seq.; Bayard, Secretary of State, 2 Moore's Digest
308; Wildenhus Case, (1887) 120 U.S. 1, 11, 12, 30 L. Ed. 565, 7 S.C.R.
385; The Exchange, (1912) 7 Cranch (U.S.) 116, 135, 143; 3 L.
Ed. 287; The Eagle, (1868) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 15, 22, 19 L. Ed. 365.
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as to certain matters.' In practice, however, all states refrain
from exercising jurisdiction in certain matters pertaining to for-'
eign ships,2 ' so the question is really whether such practice is a
concession from courtesy and convenience or an obligation of
international law. The majority of text writers, 21 including
many of British2 2 and American23 nationality and the Institute
of International Law, 4 hold the latter view, they, however, dis-
agree as to the extent of the exemption. This can only be as-
certained by appeal to reason and practice."2 Hall, though as-
serting the British view, recognizes the reasonableness of the ex-
emption in certain cases: "To attempt to exercise jurisdiction in
respect of acts producing no effect beyond the vessel, and not
tending to do so is of advantage to no one."2' 6  This logic seems
to have been recognized by municipal courts of the port state in
practice.2 7 They have generally refrained from exercising juris-
diction in civil disputes involving merely the ship's personnel,
'
0 Charteris, The Legal Position of Merchant Men in Foreign Parts, 1
British Year Book of Int. Law, 1920-21, 45; Wilson International Law,
8th ed., 129.20 Charteris, loc. cit., particularly exemptions given in British practice,
p. 66, and in German port regulations, p. 80, though according to the
writer, p. 56, both of these countries deny any obligation to accord
exemptions.
21See authorities cited by 1 Halleck, Int. Law, 4th ed., 246, and Hall,
op. cit., pp. 212-214. The latter, though recognizing that the rule of'ex-
emption "is in course of imposing itself upon the conduct of states" thinks
"it can not as yet claim to be of compulsory international authority." In
his Foreign Jurisdiction of the British Crown, however, Hall says, "the
usage is sufficiently established in its broad lines to render it a fair sub-
ject for international complaint if local authorities interfere in questions
of discipline which involve offenses criminal by British law; and gen-
erally abstention from interference goes considerably further." p. 81.
"
2 See I Westlake, Int. Law, 2nd ed., 272.
23Wheaton adheres to the British view in his International Law but in
a review of Ortolan, Diplomatie de ]a Mer, 2 Revue de Droit Francaise et
Etrang~re, 206-207 he accepts the French. See Dana ed., of Wheaton, p.
153, note 58, and Charteris, op. cit., p. 59. See also, 1 Halleck, Int. Law,
4th ed., p. 245; Davis, Int. Law, 3rd ed., p. 71; Wilson, Int. Law, 8th ed.,
p. 129.24Resolution of Aug. 23, 1898, arts. 29-32, 17 Annuaire, 231, Scott,
Resolutions of the Institute of Int. Law 151-152.2 1See 1 Westlake, op. cit., p. 216.
2
,Hall, op. cit., p. 216.
27This has often been provided by treaty. See The Ester, (1911) 190
Fed. 216; The Bound Brook. (1906) 146 Fed. 160; Tellefsen v. Fee, (1848)
168 Mass. 188; The Koenigin Luise, (1910) 184 Fed. 170. See also The
Reliance, 1 Abbott (D.C.) 317, Fed. Cas. 10,521; Willendson v. The For-
soket, (1801) 1 Pet. Adm. 197, and complaint by Secretary of State Fish
on British exercise of jurisdiction in the case of the Anna Camp, Nov. 8,
1873, 2 Moore's Digest, 293; Scott, Cases on International Law, 1st ed.,
p. 233.
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though under the LaFollette Seamen's Act of 1915 American
courts are obliged to take cognizance of cases of seamen's wages.2 8
Patent laws have generally been held inapplicable to ships in port29
and in exercising criminal jurisdiction the peace of the port rule,
first laid down by the French Conseil d'Rtat in 180630 has been
followed in most countries.2 1
"The principle which governs the whole matter is this:"
said Chief Justice Waite; "disorders which disturb only the
peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with ex-
clusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those
which disturb the public peace may be suppressed and, if need
be, the offenders punished, by the proper authorities, of the
local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to deter-
mine to which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of dis-
order belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the at-
tending circumstances of the particular case. 133 a
Administrative officials have likewise generally refrained from
interference in the ship's discipline and when they have made
arrests on board it has usually been in pursuance of the port's
legitimate jurisdiction.32 Liberation of prisoners held on board
for offenses committed at sea, or for breach of ship's discipline,
2SThe courts have construed the act so far as possible as not apply-
ing to contracts made abroad. See The Rindjani, (1919) 254 Fed. 913;
Sandberg v. McDonald, (1918) 248 U.S. 185, 63 L. Ed. 200, 39 S.C.R. 84;
Neilson v. Rhine Shipping Co. (1918) 248 U.S. 205, 63 L. Ed. 208, 39
S.C.R. 89. This was not possible however, of the contract involved in
Strathearn S. S. Co. v. Dillon, (1920) 252 U.S. 348, 64 L. Ed. 607, 401
S.C.R. 350. See also F. K. Neilsen, 13 Am. Journ. Int. Law, 12, Stowell,
Intervention in International Law, pp. 261-268.
"
9Brown v. Duchesne, (1857) 19 How. (U.S.) 183, 15 L.Ed. 595. A
British court held the reverse in Caldwell v. VanVlissingen, (1851) 9
Hare 415, 21 L. J. Ch. 97, but Parliament promptly passed a statute recog-
nizing the exemption, 46-47 Vict. c. 57 sec., 43, now in 7 Ed. VII c. 29,
sec. 48. The British Plimpsoll act of 1876, which regulated with criminal
penalties the loading of foreign vessels in British ports, caused some dis-
cussion (2 Moore's Digest 282-283) but was incorporated in the consoli-
dated shipping act of 1894 and in 1906 amendments further regulated
foreign ships in British ports in respect to loading and life saving appli-
ances. (1 Stowell and Munro, International cases 434-445). The LaFollette
seaman's act, passed by the United States in 1915 goes even farther, in
regulating the composition and care of the crew and the life saving ap-
pliances on foreign vessels clearing from American ports.
"
0Text printed in 1 British Year Book of Int. Law 1920-21, 50 and
Perels. Das Int. Offent. Seerecht der Gegenwart, 2nd ed., p. 62.31See Charteris, loc. cit.
3
,laWildenhus Case, (1886) 120 U.S. 1. 30 L.Ed. 565, 7 S.C.R. 385,
which thoroughly reviews American and Foreign Precedents. See also
Legare. Att. Gen., 4 Op. 98, 102, Cushing, Att. Gen., 8 Op. 73 and Secre-
tary of State, Webster in Creole Case, Aug. 1, 1842, 2 Moore's Digest
353-354.3 2See case of L'Ocean, 2 Moore's Digest 856. Incarceration of free
negroes on foreign vessels in ports of South Carolina before the civil war
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has been successfully protested by the flag state ;33 and in the
Creole case Great Britain was held liable in an arbitration for
liberating slaves on board an American ship in one of her West
Indian ports.3 ' Here, however, the forced entrance of the Creole
was a primary basis of the decision. In the similar case of the
Maria Luz, a later arbitration held otherwise. 35  A moral dis-
turbance of the peace may be caused by the presence of slavery
in the port of a state. Consequently this also accords with the
principle suggested by other cases, that foreign private vessels
in port are exempt from port jurisdiction except insofar as-the
local authorities are obliged to act in defense of the safety and
peace of their territory and the civil rights of their own citizens
and foreigners not of the ship's company."
Thus it would seem in accord with international law to hold
foreign merchant vessels exempt from the operation of American
prohibition laws in respect to liquor which cannot reach shore
or intoxicate any one who will reach shore. This would ob-
viously permit the United States to prohibit service to passen-
gers on board. With respect to liquor carried as cargo in transit
to foreign ports, the danger of leakage into a market offering
top prices is so great that prohibition would seem justifiable.
With respect to liquor in the ship's stores the question would
seem to depend on the adequacy of the assurances given that it
will remain there during the ship's stay in port. As for that
part of the ship's stores intended for the crew it would seem that
the law and customs of the ship's flag with respect to service in
seamen's rations may be observed, provided adequate precau-
under authority of the port act, may be justified as a measure of neces-
sary security in a state with a large slave population. Attorney General
Berrien was of this opinion in 1831, 1 Op. 762, thereby reversing the
opinion of his predecessor, Win. Wirt, in 1824 1 Op. 430. The act is also
sustained by 1 Twiss, Law of Nations, 230. Merchant vessels can not
give asylum to refugees from local justice as the United States contented
in the Barrundia case, 1890. 2 Moore's Digest, 855, 871 et seq; Scott,
Cases in Int. Law, 1st ed., p. 275.33See cases of John Anderson, (1879) The Venus, (1830), The Rein-
deer, (1856) The Atalanta, (1856) 1 Moore's Digest 932; vol. 2 p. 286
et seq. and the Admiral Hamelin, (1911), Charteris, op. cit. 82.34The Creole, (1853) 2 Moore's Digest 358.35This case (1873) involved the release of slaves by Japan from a
Peruvian vessel at Kanagawa, Charteris, op. cit. 85; 5 Moore, Int. Arbit.
5034; Darby, Int. Tribunals, 4th ed., p. 798.
3GCompare this with resolution by Institute of International Law,
1898, arts. 29-32, 17 Annuaire 231, and statement by Bonfils, De la Com-
petence des Tribunaux Francais, sec. 326 endorsed by Wilson, Int. Law,
8th ed., p. 129.
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tions are taken by the ship against sale on shore or disorder'by
drunken seamen.
3 7
If, in fact, international law accords these exemptions to
foreign private vessels in port, the term "transportation within
the United States" of the eighteenth amendment, might, under
recognized rules of construction, be held inapplicable to such
fiquor, since in law it would not be "within the United States.13 8
3. SEIZURE OF FOREIGN VESSELS BEYOND THE
T11REE-MIILE LIMIT.
A number of vessels suspected of rum smuggling have been
seized by officers enforcing the eighteenth amendment beyond
the three-mile limit, apparently under authority of an act of
1799 which authorizes revenue officers to visit vessels bound
for the United States within four leagues (twelve miles) of
the coast and penalize the masters thereof for failure to pro-
duce cargo manifests or for unloading without proper authority.31
37The law of France and other countries requires the service of wine
in seamen's rations on their ships. In Cunard Line v. Mellon, Oct. 23,
1922. Text printed in New York Times, Oct. 24, 1922, p. 2. Judge Hand
said: "If the ration is cut off some, in any case, the plaintiffs will be in a
serious dilemma between two conflicting laws. The others will probably
have a good deal of trouble and expense in securing seamen who will
sign on a "dry" ship. On the other hand, foreign crews are scarcely within
the dominant purpose of the eighteenth amendment. It appears to me
just on a fair balance of the relative advantage to stay the enforcement
of the law against stocks of wine and liquor necessary for crew's rations
if honestly kept and dispensed for that purpose alone."
3
sJudge Hand said on this question in Cunard Line v. Mellon: "Cases
like Brown v. Duchesne, (1857) 19 How. (U.S.) 183, Taylor v. United
States, (1907) 207 U.S. 120, 52 L. Ed. 130, 28 S.C.R. 53, Scharrenberg v.
Dollar Steamship Co., (1917) 245 U.S. 122, 62 L. Ed. 189, 38 S.C.R. 28
are all indeed in point. They illustrate the extent to which seamen and
ships are regarded as enclaves from the municipal law. But they were
all judicial exceptions by implication out of the words of a statute, and
they therefore depended upon how far in the circumstances of each case
it was improbable that "the natural meaning of the words expressed an
altogether probable intent." Were it not for the declaration of the Su-
preme Court in what I regard as far weaker circumstances, that the
literal meaning accords with the probable intent, they might embarrass
my conclusion. As it is, they do not, for in such matters each case is sui
generis, and I have only to follow any decision which is apt to the statute
under consideration." Attorney General Daugherty expressed similar
doubt of the Supreme Court's decision on principle: "Prior to the sweep-
ing and comprehensive construction placed upon the prohibition law in
those cases, it might possibly have been arguable whether liquors forming
a part of the ship stores on vessels within territorial waters might be re-
garded as an implied exception to the national Prohibition Act. Whatever
doubts there may have previously existed have been swept away by the
language of the majority opinion in those cases."
:i'U.S. Rev. Stat. 2760. 2813. 2814. 3067, 5770, Comp. Stat. 8459 Y b
(52), 5510, 5511, 5555. 5770: 1 Mo'xore's Digest 725: 1 Hyde, Int. Law 418,
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Seizure in such cases was sustained by judge Morton in the
United States district court at Boston in the case of the Schooner
Grace and Ruby,40 only in case actual communication of the
vessel with the shore were established and onl September 26, 1922,
President Harding ordered confinement of search and seizure
to these limits. Subsequent seizure of the Canadian schooner
Emerald 4 1 twelve miles from the coast of New Jersey, pre-
sumably under these circumstances, was protested by Great
Britain.
International law is as uncertain on this question as on that
just discussed, and on this question also the British view which
inclines to a rigid maintenance of the three-mile limit, differs
from that of continental European countries which generally
admit extensions for certain purposes to four leagues or more.4 2
The great majority of text writers and the law of most
states recognize three miles as the normal limit of jurisdictional
waters,4" but text writers generally support,44 and legislation gen-
erally provides, for a wider jurisdiction for certain purposes, and
in certain circumstances..4 ' Even Great Britain has such legis-
lation. It is true that her hovering act of 1736, which suggested
the American act of 1799, was repealed in 1876 because of doubt
as to its international validity, but acts are still in force for
quarantine and fishery protection beyond the three-mile limit.4"
Most other states authorize customs inspection of incoming ves-
sels within the four league limit.
4 7
Hershey, Int. Law, 1912, p. 198, Naval War College, Int. Law Topics,
1913, p. 18-19.
4"The Grace and Ruby, Press notices, Sept. 26, 1922.
4"The Emeral, Press notices, Oct. 18.' 1922. The British Schooner,
Henry L. Marshall was seized Aug. 1, 1921, (Stowell, 275.)42Compare Hall, op. cit., p. 266 with Russian Memorandum to Japan,
1912, U.S. For. Rel. 1912, p. 1308.43The Scandinavian countries recognize four miles, France, Spain and
Portugal six, and the Institute of International Law recomended six in
1894. See N.W.C. Int. Law Topics, 1913, p. 24, 27. It may be doubted,
however, whether a claim of general jurisdiction beyond the three mile
limit would be sustained in an international controversy. See Hall, op. cit.
157, 1 Westlake op cit. 189, and exchange of notes'in British hovering near
American coasts while the latter was neutral, March 20, April 26, 1916,
U. S. Dept. of State, White Books, Eur. War. No. 3, 1916, pp. 135, 139.
441 Westlake, Int. Law, 176; 1 Hyde, Int. Law 420.
45See N.W.C., Int. Law Topics, 1913, p. 24, 34, and U.S. For. Rel.
1912, p. 1308.4rHolland, Studies in Tnt. Law, 1898, p. 182; N. W. C. Int. Law
Topics. 1913, pp. 15-16. Hall, Foreign Jurisdiction of the Crown, 1894,
p. 243 considers some of the British Hovering Acts as still in effect.
47See N.W.C., Int. Law Topics, 1913, p. 24 et seq, and U. S. For. Rel.
1912, p. 1308.
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Decisions of municipal courts have generally sustained such
assumptions of jurisdiction but these precedents are of little
value for international law, because where they involved seizures
beyond the three-mile limit by the court's own state, the courts
have felt bound by municipal legislation.48 On the other hand,
where the seizure has been by a foreign state, the court has
usually felt obliged to recognize a title created by a decree of
condemnation by an established court of a recognized govern-
ment without considering whether the original seizure was il-
legal or not.49  The strongest municipal cases denying such jur-
isdiction are Le Louis," a British case, which, however related
to a seizure of a foreign vessel for slave trading and not for de-
fense of the state's territorial jurisdiction and Rose v. Hinely,5'
an American Supreme Court case, which was by a divided court
and overruled two years later.5la Church v. Hubbart5 2 is the case
most frequently cited in support of a right to seize beyond the
three-mile limit but this in fact turned on the illegality of the
vessel's conduct in attempting to smuggle goods, thus the in-
surers were exempted by the exception in the policy, irrespective
of the legitimacy of the seizure by Brazil (then under Portuguese
sovereignty) beyond the three mile limit. It cannot be denied,
however, that in this case Chief Justice Marshall in dicta sup-
ported the right under the circumstances:
"A nation's power to secure itself from injury may cer-
tainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory .
Any attempt to violate the laws made to protect this right,
is an injury to itself, which it may prevent, and it has a right
to use the means necessary for its prevention. These means
do not appear to be limited within any certain marked boun-
daries, which remain the same, at all times and in all situa-
tions. If they are such as unnecessarily to vex and harass
48 in re Cooper, (1892) 143 U.S. 472, 36 L. Ed. 232, 12 S.C.R. 453;
The Sylvia Handy, (1892) 143 U. S. 513, 36 L. Ed. 246: M'Xortensen v.
Peters, (1906) 14 Scot. L.T.R., 227 (Moray Firth Case) ; Direct U.S.
Cable Co. v. Anglo-Am. Telegraph Co., (1877) L.R. 2 App. Cas. 394,
(Conception Bay Case.)
19Hudson v. Guestier, (1810) 6 Cranch (U.S.) 281; Williams v.
Armroyd, (1813) 7 Cranch (U.S.) 423.50Le Louis, (1817) 2 Dods. 210.
•iRose v. Himely, (1808) 4 Cranch (U.S.) 241. 2 L. Ed. 608.
SaMarshall, C. J. in Hudson v. Guestier, (1810), 6 Cranch (U.S.) 281,
285, 3 L.Ed. 224.52Church v. Hubbart, (1804) 2 Cranch (U.S.) 187, 2 L. Ed. 249. Most
of the above cases are discussed by L. L. Woolsey, Municipal Seizures be-
yond the Three Mile Limit, U. S. For. Rel., 1912, p. 1289 and by 1 Hyde,
Int. Law, 418-419.
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foreign lawful commerce, foreign nations will resist their -ex-
ercise. If they are such as are reasonable and necessary to
secure their laws from violation, they will be submitted to."
In international controversies, however, seizures beyond the
three-mile limit have generally been condemned either by dip-
lomacy or arbitration, "3 but seldom has the question of a seizure
within reasonable limits off the coast necessary for enforcement
of local laws been squarely presented. The British protest at
the Russian hovering law of 1909 seems most nearly in point,
though here Great Britain seemed to be more directly concerned
with the Russian laws creating fishery monopoly beyond the
three-mile limit.54 It should be noticed that the United States,
although not protesting against this law, felt "constrained to
reserve all rights of whatever nature" in a note of January 21,
1911. 5- It is not believed, however, that either of these govern-
ments intended a position contrary to that asserted by Sir Charles
Russell, later Lord Chief Justice of England, in the Bering Sea
Arbitration case:56
"No civilized state will encourage offences against the
laws of another state, the justice of which laws it recognizes.
It willingly allows a foreign state to take reasonable measures
of prevention within a moderate distance even outside the ter-
ritorial waters."
This seems to support the right to seize beyond the three-
mile limit and within the twelve-mile limit where necessary
for the enforcement of revenue and other laws of local applica-
tion not violently offensive in themselves to other nations. Un-
less, however, there is clear evidence that the vessel intends
immediately or proximately to violate the state's laws within its
territory, the seizure is illegal. When pursuit of a guilty or
suspected vessel has been begun within the three mile limit, it is
generally admitted under the principle of "hot pursuit" that
seizure may be made anywhere on the high seas provided the
pursuit has been continuous until the seizure.5 7
Thus Judge Morton's opinion would seem in accord with
international law.
53Bering Sea Arbitration, 1 Moore's Digest 921; The Virginius,
(1872), 2 Moore's Digest 895, 980; LaJeune Eugenie, (1821), 2 Moore's
Digest 920; The Deerhound, (1873) 2 Moore's Digest 979.
54U. S. For. Rel. 1912, pp. 1287, 1304.55Ibid. 1299.
561 Hyde, op. cit. 419-420. This statement closely resembles that by
Hall, Foreign Jurisdiction of the Crown, p. 244.
571 Hyde. Int. Law, 420; Hall, Int. Law, 7th ed., p. 266; 1 Westlake,
Int. Law, 177.
